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THE IMPACT OF “GOING PRIVATE” ON
CORPORATE STAKEHOLDERS
Kent Greenfield *
As capital markets in the United States increasingly “go private,” there
are a number of implications of this trend that have yet to be decisively
analyzed. It is unclear how the retreat of companies from public capital
markets will affect corporate governance, business competitiveness, and
public oversight. It is also unclear how the privatization of corporate
finance will affect non-shareholder stakeholders of firms, most centrally
employees, communities, and the environment.
Some scholars and public policy experts believe that concern for such
stakeholders should not hold any relevance in the discussion of corporate
law in general, and thus may be presumed to believe the same about a
conversation about privatization. 1 In such a view, these concerns lie outside
the realm of corporate governance law; they therefore should be of no great
moment in the debate over whether public policy should respond to the
strong “going private” trend. But for those of us corporate law scholars who
assume that corporate governance should be analyzed in part according to
its impacts on a broad range of stakeholders, one cannot decide how to
respond to privatization without knowing how it affects those stakeholders. 2
I suggest that, at least at a level of abstraction and as a matter of theory,
there is little reason to be particularly skeptical of private companies, as
compared to public companies, in their treatment of stakeholder interests.
Private companies may be good citizens or bad citizens, good employers or
bad employers. But this will be determined by what happens in the
* Professor of Law and Law Fund Scholar, Boston College Law School. The author thanks
Zack Kurland and Greg Nannery for their excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Hansmann, H., Kraakman R.H., The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 442 (Jan. 2001) (arguing that the most efficacious legal mechanisms for protecting the
interests of non-shareholder constituencies lie outside of corporate law); see George W. Dent,
Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate
Governance 25 (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Paper 07-21, 2007) (advocating
“shareholder primacy” as the best way to protect non-equity stakeholders and promote social
responsibility), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995186.
2. See Silvia Ayuso, Miguel Angel Ariño, Roberto Garcia Castro & Miguel A. Rodriguez,
Maximizing Stakeholders’ Interests: An Empirical Analysis of the Approach to Corporate
Governance (IESE Business School Working Paper, Paper No. 670, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982325; David K. Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate
Personhood (Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No.
01–6, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=264141; David K. Millon, New Game Plan or
Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1001 (2000); David K. Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991); Lawrence
E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992); Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s
Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1189 (1991); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law
to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993).
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governance and behaviors of particular companies, not by some theoretical
predisposition. This essay is intended to be a brief introduction to several of
the factors that weigh into the public/private comparison.
I. TWO CONVENTIONAL WISDOMS
Conventional wisdom regarding the going private phenomenon holds
that it creates negative effects for non-shareholder stakeholders. Such a
result occurs because the surge in going private transactions is part and
parcel of the gladiatorial culture of Wall Street, 3 where financial elites buy
and sell entire companies for the gain of a tiny minority. 4 Little concern is
paid to anyone or anything other than the financial gain of those elites.
Privatization firms buy up companies and take them out of the public
markets, allowing them to be shielded from public scrutiny while they
disembowel the company of its assets. 5 The surge of privatization is
reflective of a money culture that disregards interests of anyone or anything
that cannot be translated into financial benefit to the firm. These include
environmental conscientiousness, 6 fairness to employees, 7 and democratic
norms of accountability. 8
This conventional wisdom was echoed most recently by Republican
presidential candidate Mike Huckabee, who commented on fellow
candidate Mitt Romney’s experience in private equity, saying, “[I believe]
most Americans want their next president to remind them of the guy they
work with, not the guy who laid them off.” 9 In Europe, too, privatization is
often the target of political leaders. Speaking about hedge funds and private
equity groups in April 2005, Franz Müntefering, then chairman of the
German Social Democratic Party and soon to be German vice-chancellor,
contended: “Some financial investors don’t waste any thoughts on the
people whose jobs they destroy.” 10
But there is a competing conventional wisdom, and it directly conflicts
with the first one. This narrative proposes that the only way to protect
companies that want to take a long-term view, or that want to take into
account interests that do not easily translate to financial income, is to
3. Compare www.wallstreetgladiator.com, which expressly draws on this symbolism.
4. Dale A. Oesterle, Are Leveraged Buyouts a Form of Governance Arbitrage?, 3 BROOK. J.

CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 53 (2008).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Gail Collins, Op-Ed, The Battle of the Mitts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/12/opinion/12collins.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (citing Mike
Huckabee’s Campaign Ad running in Michigan).
10. Steven J. Davis, et al., Private Equity and Employment 43 (World Econ. Forum,
Globalization of Alternative Investments, Working Papers Volume I, 2008), available at
http://www.weforum.org/df/cgi/pe/Full_Report.pdf.
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privatize the company and insulate it from the short-term pressures of the
capital markets.
The following prominent examples illustrate this
competing version of conventional wisdom.
In 1985, Levi Strauss & Co. (Levi’s) went through a leveraged buyout
(LBO), which was one of the largest ever up to that date. 11 The LBO took
the company out of the public capital markets and allowed the descendents
of Levi Strauss, the Haas family, to regain control. 12 Among the reasons
given by the family for the LBO was to enable the company to maintain its
culture of community involvement and its commitment to social
responsibility. 13 This was more than mere lip service. Soon after the LBO,
Levi’s announced uncommonly progressive standards for its contractors
and refused to do business in China for over five years to protest China’s
human rights record. 14 The company also divested its pension funds from
some companies doing business in South Africa, at a time when apartheid
still existed. 15 The LBO occurred because the company believed it had
more room to act in a socially responsible way toward its multiple
stakeholders if it were controlled by the Haas family, who has a long
familial tradition of philanthropy, 16 than by a gross aggregation of public
shareholders.
Another paradigmatic example of the social benefits of privatization is
that of Malden Mills, a private apparel company in Massachusetts. Malden
Mills, the manufacturer of Polertec fabric, suffered a devastating factory
fire just before Christmas in 1995. 17 The president and principal owner,
11. Buyout Backed at Levi Strauss, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1985, at D11, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A02EFD81338F932A05754C0A963948260.
12. Id.
13. Id. See also James Sterngold, Levi Strauss Stock Buyout Would Benefit Small Group, N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
21,
1996,
at
D2,
available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9D0DE0D61339F932A15751C0A960958260&sec=&spon= (discussing Levi’s
“growing reputation for social responsibility”).
14. William Beaver, Levi’s is leaving China – Levi Strauss, BUSINESS HORIZONS, Mar.–Apr.
1995, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1038/is_n2_v38/ai_16793712; see also
http://www.democracynow.org/1998/6/30/levi_strauss_returns_production_to_china. Even while
publicly traded, the company had followed a number of acclaimed social responsibility policies,
including an openness toward unionization and plant closing notification policies that were more
protective of employees’ interests than what the law required. See CHARLES DERBER, CORPORATE
NATION: HOW CORPORATIONS ARE TAKING OVER OUR LIVES AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT
IT, at 188, 284 (1998); see also Levi Strauss & Co. Global Sourcing and Operating Guidelines,
reprinted in KARL SCHOENBERGER, LEVI’S CHILDREN: COMING TO TERMS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE GLOBAL MARKET PLACE app. A, at 265 (2000). The argument for the LBO was, in part,
that these efforts at social responsibility might become increasingly difficult if the company
remained a public company and thus perhaps a target of hostile takeover attempts.
15. Timeline South Africa, BBC NEWS, Sept. 20, 2008, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1069402.stm.
16. How Levi’s Trashed a Great American Brands, FORTUNE, Apr. 12, 1999, available at
http://www.ninamunk.com/documents/HowLevisTrashedaGreatAmericanBrand.htm.
17. Steve Wulf & Tom Witkowski, The Glow From a Fire, TIME, Jan. 8, 1996, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,983916,00.html.
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Aaron Feuerstein, announced after the fire that the company would rebuild
the factory (even though its competitors were moving off-shore) and
maintain payroll in the meantime. 18 He paid Christmas bonuses even though
the factory was in ruins, and was held up as an example of excellent
corporate citizenship. 19
Feuerstein articulated his rationale in stakeholder-centric terms, saying:
I have a responsibility to the worker, both blue-collar and white-collar. I
have an equal responsibility to the community. It would have been
unconscionable to put 3,000 people on the streets and deliver a deathblow
to the cities of Lawrence and Methuen. Maybe on paper our company is
worthless to Wall Street, but I can tell you it’s worth more. 20

Feuerstein became a minor celebrity for a time, sitting next to Hillary
Clinton in the Senate gallery during former President Bill Clinton’s 1996
State of the Union address. 21
I have sometimes used Levi’s and Malden Mills in my own scholarship
and lectures as examples of socially responsible companies. 22 A common
challenge to such examples is that such ethical, stakeholder-oriented
behavior would be impossible for a public company. The notion implicit in
this challenge is that privatization makes social responsibility more, not
less, possible.
In fact, both the Levi’s and Malden Mills stories come with some
limitations and important caveats, if offered as examples of successful
corporate social responsibility. Levi’s is regarded as a successful business,
but it had a very tough decade in the 1990s. 23 Malden Mills has traveled an
even tougher road: it went through bankruptcy and has been purchased by
another company. 24 Feuerstein is no longer the principal owner or CEO. 25
These companies attempted, with different degrees of success, to take into
account the interests of stakeholders in an industry—the apparel business—
that is extremely competitive and labor intensive. They may or may not be
18. Id.
19. David Lamb, Massachusetts Mill Town Gets Angel for Christmas, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19,

1995, at A1.
20. BARBARA A. GLANZ, HANDLE WITH CARE: MOTIVATING AND RETAINING EMPLOYEES
251 (2002).
21. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 198 (Yale
University, 2000); see also Alison Mitchell, State of the Union: The Overview; Clinton Offers
Challenge to Nation, Declaring, ‘Era of Big Government is Over’, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at
A1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D05E2DB1F39F937A15752
C0A960958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
22. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90–91 (2006) [hereinafter THE
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW].
23. See Chris Reidy, In the Marketplace, They are no Longer Such a Great Fit, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 23, 1999, at A1; see also Greg Johnson, Blue Period, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at
D1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1997/nov/06/business/fi-50688.
24. A Change at Malden Mills, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at C8.
25. Id.
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the best examples of how companies can successfully take seriously the
concerns of stakeholders. But the fact that they tried to do so at all,
especially in such a competitive industry, is a testament to the conventional
wisdom that such efforts are more likely when companies are private and
can insulate themselves in some respects from the vagaries of the capital
markets.
Undoubtedly, it is odd to assert two conventional wisdoms about a
given subject—especially two that run at cross-purposes. But both of these
claims are prominent enough that they deserve to be called such. Also, both
conventional wisdoms have some merit, at least at the theoretical level. 26
On the one hand, private companies are often seen as havens for corporate
raiders who care little about the experiences of the businesses’ non-equity
stakeholders, and public markets are seen as a way for the public to have
influence on the decision-making of firms. On the other hand, privatization
may allow some companies the freedom from market pressures that make it
more difficult to take a long-term, stakeholder view. Let us look more
carefully at these competing stories about privatization.
II. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE COMPANIES
From the standpoint of non-shareholder stakeholders, there are key
differences between public and private companies. It is initially unclear,
however, whether there is reason to believe that one form or the other is
likely to lead to corporate governance that is more beneficial to all investors
in the firm. To find out, it is necessary to consider some major differences:
time horizon, disclosure, concentration of equity ownership, and autonomy
of management.

26. I should hasten to add that perhaps the existence of these two conflicting narratives can be
best explained by a study of the history of privatization rather than the theory of it. Both the
Levi’s and the Malden Mills experiences can be explained in major part by a dedication of the
Jewish owners to seeing the business as an extension of their own moral obligations. See SINGER,
supra note 21, at 200; SCHOENBERGER, supra note 14, at 36. The private nature of both firms
gave them the freedom to act with less attention to the short-term concerns of the capital market.
But both companies struggled to keep their vision in place in part because of the difficulties posed
by other markets, most prominently the product market. The recent going private trend does not in
any way seem motivated by social concerns. Private equity firms are not as a rule dominated by
families who want to use the companies they purchase to act out moral obligations, but by high
net worth investors that see the purchased companies as mechanisms for building wealth, usually
in a short time frame. See, e.g., Michael Alles, Private Equity Funds: Champions of Governance
and Disclosure?, 4 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE, 217, 220 (2007) (“[P]rivate investors
in private equity funds care only about making money.”), available at http://www.palgravejournals.com/jdg/journal/v4/n4/full/2050068a.html.
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A. TIME HORIZON
Private companies are not limited by the short-term vision said to
plague public markets. 27 Share turnover in publicly-traded, Fortune 500
companies is very high—over 100% per year—and is even higher for
smaller companies. 28 Reporting requirements impose quarter-by-quarter
reporting, which requires companies to track the short term and encourages
markets to reflect short-term interests. 29 A recent study of chief financial
officers revealed that a significant majority of them would voluntarily make
decisions costly to the firm in the long-term in order to meet quarterly Wall
Street projections. 30 No one advocates for short-term management, but
public markets make it more likely to occur. 31
One example of short-term thinking that hurts employees is the socalled “7 percent rule,” which is the Wall Street notion that one way to
achieve a short-term bump in stock price—usually the aforementioned
7%—is to announce lay-offs. 32 Economic studies indicate that no such
benefit continues over the long term. 33 Nevertheless, the frequency of this
short-term bump in stock prices has ensured that the “7% rule” is often a
managerial heuristic. 34 So if short-term management hurts stakeholders and
long-term management benefits stakeholders, privatization may be a
positive trend for stakeholders because it frees managers to manage with a
longer time horizon and without the need for immediate accountability in
the form of profits.
On the other hand, managers of public companies are not totally driven
toward short-term gains. Managers of public companies often have a longer
time horizon than shareholders, and the business judgment rule gives those
managers sufficient leeway to manage with an eye toward at least the
medium term. 35 Privatization, in contrast, is often done in order to perform
a quick-flip of the target company, often within a year or two. 36 When
management takes such a short time horizon, stakeholders with a long-term
horizon (e.g., employees, communities, and those concerned with the
environment) tend to lose out. 37 Perhaps the question of whether
27. Mark Goyder, Ownership and Sustainability – Are Listed Companies More Responsible,
ETHICAL CORPORATIONS, July 14, 2008, at 46–49.
28. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED
OVER INDUSTRY 277–78 (2007).
29. Goyder, supra note 27, at 46–49.
30. MITCHELL, supra note 28, at 277–78.
31. Goyder, supra note 27, at 46–49.
32. For a more in-depth description of the 7% rule, see Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming
Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 12–13 (2008).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 13–14.
36. See SEIU, BEHIND THE BUYOUTS: INSIDE THE WORLD OF PRIVATE EQUITY 14 (Apr.
2007); see generally Oesterle, supra note 4 (discussing the short term horizon of PE firms).
37. See Oesterle, supra note 4.

2008] The Impact of "Going Private" on Corporate Stakeholders

81

privatization is a good thing for non-equity stakeholders turns on an
empirical judgment on the number of companies taken private only to be
flipped. According to the World Economic Forum, while leveraged buyouts
using private funds are quicker to flip than those using public funds, only
12% of privately-funded LBOs go public or are re-sold within two years,
and less than 3% do so within twelve months. 38 At face value, this data
supports the notion that privatization would not have a large impact on the
time horizon of management, at least with regard to stakeholders.
When all is said and done, perhaps what can be said is that in private
firms, it is more possible for managers to manage for the long term, even if
not more likely. To the extent that, in the long term, stakeholder interests
and shareholder interests in fact coalesce, 39 private companies may at least
have more freedom to bring that coalescence about. Moreover, if
stakeholder-oriented firms allocate surplus differently, a longer time
horizon might matter, because more time often allows reciprocal benefits of
stakeholder management to accrue. 40 For example, studies show that when
employees believe their employers treat them fairly, employees are more
loyal and obey company rules more. 41 This reciprocity is a natural human
reaction and does not develop overnight. So, when stakeholder governance
creates good feelings on the part of employees and other stakeholders, a
longer time horizon would allow the benefits gained from those good
feelings to accrue.
This theory must include a handful of caveats. First, to the extent that
long-term interests of shareholders and other stakeholders do not
necessarily coalesce, the lengthened time horizon will not be a significant
benefit to privatization. Second, the long term may be too far away to make
such coalescence real. As Keynes would say, in the long term we are all
dead. 42 If that is true, then perhaps what really matters is not long-term
management, but the current allocation of corporate surplus (i.e., whether
private companies will allocate less of the corporate surplus to equity and
more to communities and employees). While being a private company
might make such an allocation more possible if equity and management
want it to occur, there is nothing in the structure of the governance of
private companies that makes it occur on its own accord.

38. See Davis, supra note 10.
39. See Oesterle, supra note 4.
40. For a more robust analysis of reciprocal benefits in the workplace and in corporate

governance, see THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 22, at 158–85.
41. For a more in-depth analysis of this effect within companies, see Kent Greenfield, Using
Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool,
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 627–40 (2002).
42. JOHN M. KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923).
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B. DISCLOSURE
One of the oft-mentioned distinctions between private and public firms
is the fact that private companies can go “dark” and can operate without
disclosing certain kinds of information to the public. 43 Information that can
be hidden from the public can include specifics of executive compensation,
financial structure, and plans for the future. 44 To the extent that stakeholders
use the data in their labor negotiations, consumer purchasing habits, or
shareholder activism to pressure companies to act differently, the loss of
this information to the public is a key difference between public and private
firms. One might see the obligation of disclosure as one part of the implicit
social contract between business and a democratic society. That is,
disclosure might be seen as a part of the set of requirements imposed by the
polity on the corporate form in exchange for the power to aggregate
wealth. 45 To the extent that private firms are less subject to that democratic
check, they may take into account the interests of the polity less often than
public firms.
There are several indications that these differences in disclosure do not
have much of an impact on stakeholders. First, according to Robert Bartlett,
a significant and growing percentage of private companies voluntarily
subject themselves to disclosure obligations, including those of SarbanesOxley. 46 Perhaps disclosure is a bonding mechanism for management to
reassure investors, and even the public at large. 47 In any event, privatization
is increasingly done not to avoid financial disclosure but for other reasons.
Something other than disclosure obligations is driving companies to
privatize.

43. For an excellent analysis of the effects of privatization on disclosure, see Robert P.
Bartlett, III, Going Private But Staying Public: Reexamining the Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on
Firms’ Going Private Transactions, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1088830.
44. See Oesterle, supra note 4.
45. Andre Kah Hin Khor, Social Contract Theory, Legitimacy Theory and Corporate Social
and Environmental Disclosure Policies: Constructing a Theoretical Framework (unpublished
essay), Nottingham Univ. Bus. Sch. available at http://www.ibe.org.uk/runner-up%20essay%20%20undergrad%20category.pdf.
46. See Bartlett, supra note 43.
47. Irene Karamanou & George P. Nishiotis, Disclosure vs. Legal Bonding: Can Increased
Disclosure Substitute for Cross-Listing?, at 4 (Mar. 2007), available at
http://www.hec.unil.ch/urccf/seminar/IAS%20vs%20CL.pdf (citing research suggesting that
bonding benefits are associated with increased disclosure); Richard Lambert, Christian Leuz &
Robert E. Verrecchia, Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital, at 16 (Aug.
2006), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/06/0620.pdf (“As more public
information is generated, the assessed variance of the firm’s cash flows goes down, and the
discount of price relative to the expected cash flow declines.”); see generally David Easley &
Maureen O’Hara, Information and the Cost of Capital, 59 J. FIN. 1553, 1554–1583 (2004); Jeffrey
Ng, The Effect of Information Quality on Liquidity Risk, (July 21, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097382.
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The second reason why differences in disclosure may nevertheless be
immaterial to stakeholders is that typical financial disclosure provides only
limited benefits to non-equity stakeholders. Materiality to shareholders does
not equal materiality to employees or other stakeholders, and the disclosure
of financial data may reveal little of importance to those interests. For
example, financial disclosure may mean little to employees who worry
about whether the company is going to relocate their particular factory
overseas. The decision may not be material to the typical shareholder, in
that it would not have a reasonable likelihood of affecting the shareholder’s
decision to buy or sell the stock, especially if the company is large and the
factory relatively small in comparison to the company’s business as a
whole. But such a decision would be absolutely crucial to the employees
who are employed in the factory. So the requirement that companies
disclose material financial information may simply be neither here nor there
to most employees.
C. CONCENTRATION OF EQUITY OWNERSHIP
Private companies, by definition, have more concentrated equity
ownership. 48 To some degree, this concentration makes companies appear
to be more like European companies, which are typically held less widely
than U.S. companies. 49 In Europe, blocks of shares are owned by banks or
other institutions, 50 and thus their shares are also typically less liquid than
those of U.S. public firms. This correlates with a greater concern for nonequity stakeholders, which is much more of a mainstream idea in European
managerial circles compared to the United States. 51 This greater concern for
stakeholders may spring from a more robust social contract between
businesses and the European polity, or it may be derived from a greater
identification between the equity holders and the companies, which in turn
imposes reputational constraints on the behavior of the company that would
not exist if the equity were held in a more diffuse way. Or, it might spring
from the fact that the lower liquidity means that the equity holders are more
likely to be physically located in or near the facilities of the companies in
48. See generally Oesterle, supra note 4 (referring to the requirement that a company that goes
private has less than 300 shareholders).
49. See THOMAS CLARKE & MARIE DELA RAMA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 9 (2008), available at http://www.ccg.uts.edu.au/PDF/fundamentals_of_cg.pdf.
(“Though there are many widely held companies in Western Europe, an analysis of ownership
structure . . . demonstrate[s] that ownership concentration is more extensive.”).
50. See also Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate
Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 604 (2000) (showing tables of ownership concentration across
countries).
51. See Torsten Sewing, Governance: Germany - Driving Through Governance Reform,
ETHICAL CORPORATIONS, Dec. 16, 2007, at 47; see also John Russell, Governance: F&C
Investments - Governance Worth Investing In, ETHICAL CORPORATIONS, June 16, 2008 at 41–42;
Goyder, supra note 27, at 46–49.
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question, so that the behavior of the companies in question are more likely
to affect the equity holders themselves. Moreover, this concern for
employees in particular is woven into the fabric of corporate governance in
Europe; the requirement that employees be represented on the company
board, known as “co-determination,” exists in 18 of the 25 European Union
nations. 52
The comparison between European publicly-traded companies and U.S.
privately-held companies may therefore be helpful. Lower liquidity and
greater concentration of ownership lead to a greater identification between
the holders of equity and the company itself. It also may mean that the
holders of the equity are more likely to be physically located near company
facilities. To the extent these parallels hold true—and it is an empirical
question whether they do—one should not be surprised if it is indeed the
case that private firms in the U.S. consider themselves freer than public
companies to take into account the interests of stakeholders.
On the other hand, more concentrated equity ownership means that
ownership is bound to be more idiosyncratic. With concentrated equity
ownership, such ownership can either be socially responsible like Aaron
Feuerstein or be his morally bankrupt mirror image. As compared to public
market investors, private equity investors are as likely to be more profitoriented as less profit-oriented. 53 According to Dale Oesterle, private firms
bear this out, and are more focused on the returns of equity ownership than
are public firms. 54
There is a different side of the story. Public markets, including capital
markets, have all kinds of players in them. 55 Not all players in the capital
markets model themselves after gladiators; some shareholders use their
equity ownership to advance other purposes and ideals. Shareholders
include unions, public employee pension funds, church groups, and law
professors. Shareholders can influence the market and can engage in
shareholder activism on anything from the use of napalm to force-feeding
geese. 56
Separation of ownership and control may counterbalance the restraints
of the public market, however. With public companies, the “separation of
52. REBECCA PAGE, CO-DETERMINATION IN GERMANY – A BEGINNERS’ GUIDE 31 (2006).
53. See Donald Jay Korn, Working the Private Equity Circuit, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Nov. 1,

1998, http://www.allbusiness.com/business-finance/equity-funding-private-equity/707232-1.html.
(Generally “private equity investors are extremely profit-oriented, there are exceptions—
especially local groups that have alternative goals.”).
54. See Oesterle, supra note 4.
55. See CTR. FOR CAPITAL FLOW ANALYSIS, CAPITAL MARKET PLAYERS: INVESTORS,
ISSUERS, AND INTERMEDIARIES, available at http://www.capital-flow-analysis.com/marketsectors/market-players.html.
56. See Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F.Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985) (shareholder sued
company to include shareholder’s proposal regarding force-feeding geese for production of foie
gras); Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. S.E.C., 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (SEC did not require Dow
Chemical to include a shareholder proposal to limit Dow’s sales of napalm in proxy statement).
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ownership and control” means that equity holders may not identify with, or
be identified with, the activities of the companies whose stock they own. 57
There is thus a loss of reputational constraint on the behavior of public
firms. 58 It is possible that, with private companies, they will be identified
with their dominant equity investors simply by reputation. For example, the
fact that the Haas family saw Levi’s as their company meant that they
projected their family values onto the company culture, to the benefit of the
company’s stakeholders. 59
One other effect of concentrated equity ownership deserves mention.
As equity ownership becomes more concentrated, it is typical for
companies to rely on debt rather than equity financing, which leads to a
higher debt-to-equity ratio. 60 This higher leverage may have effects on nonshareholder stakeholders. It is a financial truism that leverage leads to
greater volatility in return on equity. 61 To the extent that such volatility
leads to riskier decisions on the part of management (because equity holders
enjoy a disproportionate benefit from risky decisions that pay off, and their
downside risk is limited because of limited liability), high leverage will be a
negative for those stakeholders that value stability rather than risk. 62 In
other words, to the extent private firms are highly leveraged, they will have
greater incentives to make riskier decisions with the possibility of high
payoffs. 63 This will be especially true if the equity of the specific private
company is held in a private equity firm that has a number of such
companies in a diversified portfolio, because the risk is hedged. 64 From the
standpoint of the private equity firm, the risk of any particular company
failing because of its risky decisions is more than made up for by the
potential upside to equity in the other companies. 65 From the standpoint of
the stakeholders of the individual firms, who are not able to diversify away
the downside risk of their company’s failure, the riskier decisions brought
about by high leverage are a worry. 66
57.
58.
59.
60.

See Beaver, supra note 14.
Id.
Id.
See Güner Gürsoy and Kürşat Aydoğan, Equity Ownership Structure, Risk-Taking and
Performance: An Empirical Investigation in Turkish Companies, Bilkent University, Ankara,
Turkey (1998), available at http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~aydogan/OwnershipStructure.pdf.
61. Frederic L. Pryor, ECONOMIC EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE (1996), at 110, available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=OPvCsPjeJ68C&pg=PA110&lpg=PA110&dq=leverage+leads
+to+greater+volativolatility&source=web&ots=w1AGVKSOX-&sig=JhyuIuqGapr8jI5NYfEYwn
iT2ZY&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=6&ct=result.
62. Gürsoy & Aydoğan, supra note 60.
63. Id.
64. Efficient Markets and the Portfolio Theorem, http://arnoldkling.com/econ/saving/
portfol.html (last visisted Nov. 4, 2008).
65. Id.
66. For a related point, see generally Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58
CASE. W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), for a discussion of the divergent interests of nonshareholder stakeholders and shareholders with regards to how leveraged a company should be.
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D. AUTONOMY OF MANAGEMENT
If management is more autonomous, it is possible for managers to use
their autonomy to allocate more of the corporate surplus to employees and
other stakeholders. 67 Discretion can mean that more of the corporate surplus
goes to employees and other stakeholders, because managers can use their
own sense of fairness and “just dessert” as a guide in allocating the
accumulated corporate surplus and can be freed from a strict fiduciary
obligation to maximize returns to shareholders. 68 This was the ostensible
argument behind the stakeholder statutes adopted during the 1980s: by
giving more autonomy to managers, non-equity stakeholders would
benefit. 69 Some research bolsters the argument that this effect has been one
of the by-products of those stakeholder statutes. 70
With regard to the public/private company debate, one would assume
that management is less autonomous in a public company because the
company faces capital market discipline 71 and the managers occasionally
face legal discipline if they do not pay close attention to the well-being of
shareholders. 72 In private companies, there is less capital market pressure
and thus the potential for more managerial autonomy. 73 And assuming the
benevolence of private company management, this autonomy will give it
67. See Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121 (1991);
Frank J. Garcia, Note, Protecting Nonshareholder Interests in the Market for Corporate Control a
Role for State Takeover Statutes, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 507 (1990); Alexander C. Gavis,
Comment, A Framework For Satisfying Corporate Directors’ Responsibilities Under State
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1451
(1990).
68. See generally McDaniel, supra note 67; Garcia, supra note 67; Gavis, supra note 67. For a
detailed description of a behavioral experiment showing how managers unfettered with an
obligation to advance solely the interests of shareholders might use such freedom, see Kent
Greenfield and Peter C. Kostant, An Experimental Test of Fairness Under Agency and ProfitMaximization Constraints (With Notes on Implications for Corporate Governance), 71
GEO.WASH. L. REV. 983 (2003).
69. See McDaniel, supra note 67; Garcia, supra note 67; Gavis, supra note 67.
70. A study conducted by Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan supports this
argument. They studied the impact on wages of state anti-takeover legislation, which many states
passed during the 1980s. On the basis of their findings, they argue that anti-takeover legislation
decreased the threat of takeovers and, thus, expanded managerial discretion. Using firm-level data,
Bertrand and Mullainathan found that anti-takeover laws increased non-management wages 1% to
2% or about $500 per year. This study bolsters the proposition that managers, if given more legal
discretion to allocate the firm’s surplus without fear of legal challenge, would allocate more to
labor. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test
Using Takeover Legislation (MIT Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper No. 98-19, 1998). See also
Greenfield and Kostant, supra note 68, at 983 n.74.
71. See Arnoud W. A. Boot, Radhakrishnan Gopalan & Anjan V. Thakor, Market Liquidity,
Investor Participation and Managerial Autonomy: Why do Firms Go Private?, 2–3 J. FIN.
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://www.olin.wustl.edu/firs/pdf/MemberPapers/472/14.pdf.
72. Managers can be held legally responsible for actions that violate their duty of care if
shareholders can prove that decisions are not properly informed. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.,1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984).
73. See Boot et al., supra note 71.
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more flexibility to allocate a greater portion of the corporate surplus to nonequity stakeholders.
But this does not ring true with the current privatization trends. Private
equity firms do not appear to follow in the Aaron Feuerstein or Haas family
models. As Dale Oesterle has written, private equity firms today are even
more oriented toward the prerogatives of equity than are public firms. 74 If
this is right, then the autonomy of private-firm management might be used
not for the benefit of stakeholders, but for the benefit of the managers
themselves and their cohort of equity owners.
Moreover, the notion that managers have more autonomy in private
firms may simply be incorrect. Owners of private-company equity may be
more involved and engaged in the management of private firms. 75 They
may not take too kindly to management allocating corporate wealth they
believe is theirs to other stakeholders. Ironically, management of public
firms may be better able to use their own moral sensibilities as a guide than
the management of private firms. The equity of public companies is
typically held by gross aggregations of shareholders, and shareholders have
difficulty coordinating their monitoring efforts. 76 Management is therefore
insulated from oversight because of agency costs. 77 Concentrated
ownership, more of the norm in private companies, makes it easier for
shareholders to monitor management and more difficult for management to
“go off the reservation” and act in ways that benefit stakeholders at the
expense of shareholders. 78
III. CONCLUSION
Obviously, this discussion is merely a first cut at the various ways in
which private companies may be better or worse for stakeholders than
public companies. There certainly are other material characteristics of
private firms that I have not identified here. But given this first view, it does
not appear that privatization is necessarily positive or negative for
stakeholders. There may be somewhat more freedom for private firms to
operate with a view toward stakeholder interests, but the impact is likely to
be marginal. And that freedom could cut the other way, giving private firms
the ability to insulate themselves from stakeholder interests and public
oversight, making them even more profit-oriented and less concerned about
the public interest.

74. See Oesterle, supra note 4.
75. See id. (discussing how private company management are more accountable to

shareholders).
76. Marco Pagano and Ailsa Röell, The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs,
Monitoring, and the Decision to go Public, 113 Q. J. OF ECON., 187–225 (1998).
77. Id.
78. Id.

88

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 3

To protect stakeholders, assistance should come from legal reforms
such as adjustments in fiduciary duty requirements and the makeup of
corporations’ decision-making bodies. These reforms should be applied to
both publicly-traded and privately-financed firms. The benefits to
stakeholders arising organically from privatization, if they exist at all, are
likely to be marginal. If we are convinced that stakeholders deserve some
additional protection, then we should look outside of corporate governance
or seek to weave a concern for their interests into the very fabric of the firm
itself. 79

79. For a more robust exploration of this possibility, see generally Greenfield, supra note 66.

